Zašto se ne možemo svi slagati?

U čemu je stvar?

1. Republikanski predsjednički kandidat Ted Cruz nedavno je prilikom propitivanja Fedove guvernerke Janet Yellen kritizirao američku centralnu banku zbog navodnog stezanja monetarne politike 2008. godine, što je po njegovom mišljenju dovelo do ekonomske krize.
2. Sama drugarica Yellen ostala je pomalo zatečena takvom tvrdnjom, dok je Cruzov nastup očekivano oduševio kvazi-monetariste poput Davida Beckwortha i Scotta Sumnera: na vidiku je potencijalni protržišni konzervativac koji nije hard money fanatik (što nije baš tako uobičajena pojava).
3. Očekivano, Robert Murphy nije oduševljen i osporava Cruzovu (tj. kvazi-monetarističku) tezu o restriktivnoj politici kao uzroku financijske krize i recesije. Murphy također vidi Fed kao glavnog krivca za recesiju, ali ne zbog stezanja monetarne politike, već zbog pretjerano ekspanzivne politike koja je navodno generirala neodrživi boom, a čije je puknuće bilo neizbježno.

No, za svojevrsni rule of thumb bilo bi dobro pročitati komentar Dr. Selgina:

The belief that one must must choose between “tight money did it” and “loose money did it” in accounting for the Fed’s role in the recent crisis (or its role in the Great Depression, for that matter), is one of the more obnoxious contaminants of rational debate on the question.

Central banks are central planners of money. And like all central planners, they aren’t up to the job. But that doesn’t mean that they only err in one direction: if it did, improving their performance would be a cinch! Though no one can deny an inflationary bias, central banks often err on the side of tight money. The Fed did so, notoriously, in 1937-8, when it doubled reserve requirements. And it did so in 2008–just as Ted Cruz suggested–even if Cruz’s explanation of how it did so is not coherent. Saying so does not mean denying that easy money contributed to the boom. That may also have been true – and I am pretty sure it was.

How did the Fed make money tight in 2008 despite all that “emergency” lending? Up through September of that year, it sterilized its loans, meaning that it took as many reserves away from sound banks, by trading Treasury securities for cash, as it lent to unsound ones. It did so even as spending started its downward-dive during 2008Q3. Then, when it ran out of Treasuries to sell in October, it started paying interest on reserves instead, with the same, avowed purpose, viz: that of making sure that its support for troubled institutions (and later large-scale asset purchases), wouldn’t result in any increase in bank lending that might cause the fed funds rate to drop below the Fed’s (then already hopelessly high) target. Again, this was when lending and spending were crashing!

A collapse in spending is ipso-facto evidence of a shortage of liquidity. That’s not a “Keynesian” proposition. Even classical economists “got” it. Good monetary systems don’t allow this to happen, but central monetary planners sometimes do, just as they sometimes create excesses of liquidity that translate into excessive lending and spending and, unless productivity is also rising, higher prices.

Good Austrian economists understood the dangers of deficient as well as of excessive money. Mises did. Hayek also. The version of “Austrian” monetary economics that pretends that money can be too loose but never too tight is just a comic-book version. Ted Cruz is no monetary theorist, Austrian or otherwise. But at least he “gets” one thing that cartoon Austrians don’t.

Kao i obično, profesor Selgin ovdje zvuči najrazumnije i ovome se nema što puno za dodati. Murphy je vjerojatno u pravu oko toga da je labava monetarna politika pridonijela puhanju nekih balona čije je puknuće izazvalo početak recesije, ali radikalno stezanje monetarne politike od ljeta 2008. je značajno pogoršalo situaciju i učinilo recesiju dubljom nego što bi inače bila, a to je propust centralnih banaka (i Feda i ECB-a). Nema tu ništa nekompatibilno ili kontradiktorno, niti ima razloga zašto bi tako objašnjenje ikome bilo neprihvatljivo.